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According to Hobbes, the doctrine of lines and figures – geometry – crosses no man’s 




 Putting aside anecdotal stories of punches thrown between 
drunken mathematicians at conferences, this seems convincing. Established geometrical 
proofs cannot be disputed – they can only be repressed or burnt.  
Yet Hobbes did not say that geometry does not involve ambition, profit or lust, only that 
it is a domain where they cannot be crossed – our ambition for geometry’s progress, the 
profit we take from it, and the lust we have for its breed of certainty, all work to bring us 
together rather than dividing us. Indeed, is not Hobbes entire project an ambition driven 
by lust for the profit of geometric method?  In attempting to create a politics more 
geometrico, as indisputable as Euclid’s Elements, he aims to eradicate the possibility of 
civil war and found a community without internal division or dispute. Perhaps philosophy 
itself began with such a gesture, with Socrates and Plato stepping forward and similarly 
declaring their lust for geometry – the very sophia that we philia having always taken 
geometric proof as its ideal model.  
 
Yes, the philosopher loves geometry – loves the non-violent compulsion to accept its 
indubitable statements, the power that crosses racial and religious borders, the breaking 
down of class divisions when even a slave boy can be guided to construct a geometric 
proof, the certainty of acceptance by any type of being that can grasp its concepts 
whether angels, aliens, the dead or the unborn. As such, the sign over our Academy still 
states: “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here”; or more accurately: “Let no one 
ageometritos – ungeometried – enter”.  
 
Yes, you must be geometritos to enter the Academy. Why? Because in geometry we 
witness in its pure state the ideal that every philosopher must want to spread to merit the 
title “philosopher”. We come to philosophy desirous of a community first granted by 
geometry – from those who congregated beneath the Stoa or in Epicurus’s garden to 
Husserl’s vision of harmonious disciples carrying out regional phenomenological studies 
like cartographers mapping-out the continents. If philosophy is the queen of the sciences, 
surely geometry remains the queen mother – the original, nurturing love-object whose 
traits we attempt to recapture in every later love? 
 According to Husserl, it was this love that gave birth to philosophy and with it to Europe. 
It was what differentiated what the Greeks did from the earlier Egyptians or Babylonians 
and from the “philosophies” of the Indians or the Chinese. In ‘The Vienna Lecture’, 
Husserl claimed that these other cultures did not have true science, they had only: 
 
a vocation-like life-interest, leading through understandable motivations to 
vocational communities in which the general results are propagated or develop 
from generation to generation. […] only in the Greeks do we have a universal 
(“cosmological”) life-interest in the essentially new form of a purely “theoretical” 
attitude, and this as a communal form in which this interest works itself out for 
internal reasons, being the corresponding, essentially new [community] of 
philosophers, of scientists (mathematicians, astronomers, etc.). These are men 
who, not in isolation but with one another and for one another, i.e., in 
interpersonally bound communal work, strive for and bring about theoria and 
nothing but theoria, whose growth and constant perfection […] is finally taken up 
into the will with the sense of an infinite and common task.2
 
 
A striving for theoria and nothing but theoria, theoria cut off from the religious-mythic 
attitude and practical vocational aims, theoria with no connection to the “understandable 
motivations” of a mere conceptual labourer, theoria taken up into the will as an entirely 
new structure of motivation. This new definition of what “will” can mean – a will 
without understandable motivation and thus a kind of love – transforms the relations and 
priorities of all prior life-world practices: subordinating them and creating a new model 
of human existence. Simultaneously, and this is Husserl at his most Hegelian, this 
transformation only takes place in parallel with establishing individuals’ mutual 
recognition in pursuit of this common spiritual task – a recognition that differentiates true 
science and its infinite community from a mere individual or collective finite vocation. 
Husserl is not shy to call this group a “we-subjectivity” – individuals working with and 
for one another in a communal form that is working itself out for internal reasons. When 
Husserl calls this task “infinite” it is always in connection with it being ungrounded in 
any particularity – the European task is for all nations as every local life-world can be 
transformed by joining this common purpose.  
 
Geometry plays a special role here since Europe spreads its infinite task through 
geometry, while that possibility of contagion is not unrelated to the task’s infinity. The 
Chinese or the Indian life-world was quite alien to the European; we might assume that 
any communication across cultural borders would have necessitated an open, unending, 
mutual hermeneutic labour. However, according to Husserl this was not the case as their 
pre-scientific life-world was already spatio-temporally structured. Through this common 
structure they can not only appreciate that the truths of Western geometry are valid for 
their own worlds and indeed for all possible life-worlds, but beyond this they can glimpse 
the nature of an infinite task. Later we will perhaps be able to share aesthetic, moral and 
political truths from the European life-world, but it will necessarily begin through 
geometry. Thus, the Academy’s gates remain the gateway to Europe. 
 
Yet this opens a major question with regard to one of Husserl’s last texts: ‘The Origin of 
Geometry’. Famously Husserl’s genetic phenomenology seeks to avoid Platonism – it is 
not that triangles and squares were “out there” waiting to be discovered. Rather, at a 
certain moment in time, a first mental act occurred of which they were the object. From 
then onwards, the very possibility of future mental acts with the same noema as their 
object means that the noema must endure within temporality – even when it is not 
presently the object of any mental act in a living subjectivity. This persistence requires 
that the noema can move from its first occurrence in the present experience of an 
individual to the spoken community of a culture – a community where each member can 
reactivate the same experience and recognise it as the same experience – and then onward 
into the medium of “dead” writing. These requirements are of course transcendental 
rather than empirical. It is not the actual sharing nor the actual writing down that is 
necessary; rather, it is the possibility that geometric ideas could be written down and that 
they can persist encoded in a dead medium which would allow for their reactivation – 
that is the condition for their irreal existence, their peculiar temporality. There can be no 
science, no exact science at least, of that which is not ultimately grounded in a repeatable, 
self-present experience that could be reactivated in any subjectivity on encountering 
certain encoded instructions. There is an interesting discussion to be had here 
surrounding Fink’s early claims, approved by Husserl, about the impossibility of 
encoding the phenomenological reduction itself in writing. We’ve also seen that the 
object of a mental act, the noema, is immortal through its capacity to return – this will of 
course open one of the major counterclaims in Derrida’s early works where the 
possibility of failure and annihilation is itself a transcendental condition for the 
appearance of the noema: introducing a transcendental meaning of death that 
contaminates the transcendental field with possibilities traditionally associated with the 
empirical. Neither issue is for this paper.  
What I’d like to address instead is an outstanding naïve question that hangs over 
Husserl’s protogeometer: the mythical first founder of geometry whose original 
experience establishes the existence of things such as triangles and squares within a 
community such that other thinkers working after their mental act can be said to be 
thinking about the same noema as that protogeometer. This protogeometer, were they 
Babylonian or Greek? 
Geometry in Babylon 
 
I am not asking the phenomenologically irrelevant “philological-historical question” of 
“the search for the first geometers who actually uttered pure geometrical propositions”3. 
Instead, the non-philological question is whether a Babylonian uttering a geometrical 
truth is doing geometry. The Babylonian with his finite vocational alignment certainly 
seems to be able to attain certain truths that we’d call geometrical – it is entirely 
conceivable he could have worked out Pythagoras’ Theorem. Furthermore, Husserl tells 
us they can share what they discover within a vocationally oriented community and even 
pass their accumulated items of knowledge from generation to generation, presumably 
encoded in writing. So, we seem to have the symbolic encoding of a primordial 
experience of a shared object, to have indubitable truths and to have a community. Yet, 
this is a finite knowledge with no infinite horizon – there is no infinite task, no theoria for 
theoria’s sake, it is prior to “true” science and to science’s infinite community. 
 
Without having space to go into detail here, I think we must conclude from Husserl’s text 
that the protogeometer is Greek. Not only do the Greeks establish true geometry with true 
science, but more controversially they have the first mental act of which the noema is a 
true geometric concept – the true-triangle’s noema being infinite and having all the truths 
of the triangle folded up within it such that their unfolding will reveal only what was 
always-already true of the noema. The noema of the quasi-triangle of the Babylonian is 
finite – even if the quasi-geometer manages to grasp a truth such as Pythagoras’ Theorem 
it would be an addition to this finite noema rather than an unveiling.  
 
Husserl’s science of sciences is thus intimately tied up with the love for the model of a 
particular objectivist science. It is a science without Bachelardian epistemic breaks or 
Kuhnian paradigm shifts, a science where there is: 
 
a total acquisition of spiritual accomplishments which grows through the 
continued work of new spiritual acts into new acquisitions […] geometry must 
have arisen out of a first acquisition […] We understand its persisting manner of 
being […as ] a continuous synthesis in which all acquisitions maintain their 
validity […] the total acquisition is, so to speak, the total premise for the 
acquisitions of the new level. […] The same is true of every science.4
 
  
This claim that what is true of geometry is true of every science is normative and 
eliminative rather than descriptive – Newton’s laws reveal themselves as inaccurate in the 
light of relativity, phlogiston is denied in chemistry, etc. Of course there is an infinite task 
in physics and chemistry, but it is muddied in comparison to the pure infinite task in 
geometry. We thus encounter an interplay where, on the one hand, geometry is just 
another objectivist science in crisis and in need of phenomenological salvation, while at 
the same time geometry is the ideal model for the sciences including phenomenology. Not 
in terms of its method – which remains objectivist – but in terms of its progressive 
structure. 
According to Hobbes, the doctrine of lines and figures – geometry – crosses no man’s 
A Geometric Series? 
However, what do we actually discover in the history of phenomenology as 
transcendental logic and science of sciences? Does it meet Husserl’s vision of 
harmonious disciples and their local cartographic studies? No. We discover quite the 
opposite. Rather than deepening investigations and occasional corrections, we find 
radical reformulations, rejections, and what we might call acts of parricide. For example, 
having moved to Freiburg to study under Husserl in 1928, Levinas was disappointed 
because all the major questions were already answered and, as he put it, “there was no 
longer any surprise”.5 Levinas was disillusioned, yet having gone to see Husserl he found 
Heidegger – the son who killed the father and who had not yet closed the doors for future 
revolutions. Nevertheless, soon Levinas himself would be committing yet another 
parricide against Heidegger. Wasn’t this always the way with philosophy, from the 
Eleatic Stranger’s parricide of Parmenides to Aristotle’s rejection of Platonism?  
 
Perhaps then philosophical work always takes place in a tension between the necessary 
fantasy of a progressive community and the desire for parricide. Is this not rooted in our 
implicit metaphilosophy to such an extent that we refuse to recognise as genuine 
“philosophy” works that lacks either element – for example, Nietzsche is an anti-
philosopher insofar as he doesn’t believe in the progressive accumulation of truths only 
the expression of a personal taste; while the average philosophy lecturer is not a 
“philosopher” because they have not rejected their predecessors to produce something 
new. If Heidegger had simply followed Husserl’s methods and produced a 
phenomenology of religion, would he not be a technician rather than a “philosopher”? 
 
It might be suggested that philosophy is dialectical: that rather than a linear, accumulative 
progress as in geometry, philosophy progresses through negation? Yet, what if 
philosophy cannot embrace dialectics without the fantasy that “after me there will no 
longer be negation, I will not be negated, now there is linear progress”? Hegel himself 
embodies this by saying that all previous philosophers negated each other until his 
absolute knowledge, which is never negated. Even Marx, who says history proper begins 
with communism, is saying it will no longer have the dialectical structure of our present 
pre-history driven by class-struggle.  
 
Returning to the reflections with which I began: philosopher’s love of geometry, non-
violence, indubitability, steady progress. For all the philosophers professed love for these 
things and to whatever extent he must necessarily be aligned towards that vision, is that 
what he actually loves at all? Isn’t the philosopher driven by lust for quite the opposite – 
for violence, polemics and wars? Wouldn’t a solid, indisputable truth such as the 
Archimedean point of the cogito actually arrest this glorious violence? Isn’t that the great 
meta-philosophical paradox: that one must fight for a model of peaceful certainty while 
driven by something radically opposed to that peace? 
 
One might think it makes no difference to the truth of a science what the fantasies and 
secret desires of the investigators are. Surely it doesn’t matter to the truth of E=mc2 
whether Einstein was motivated by theoria for theoria’s sake or by the desire for fame 
and reward? Yet, everything in Husserl implies that actually this does matter – if not in 
objectivist science, then at least in the science of those sciences that has to formulate the 
nature of desire in science as theoria for theoria’s sake to access true scientific, non-
vocational idealities.  
According to Hobbes, the doctrine of lines and figures – geometry – crosses no man’s 
A Science of the Science of Science 
I would suggest then that the real crisis, the one that a science of sciences needs to arm us 
against if we are to take back the sciences from the point of oblivion, would be that 
phenomenology lacks a critical account of desire and community. To use a French 
invocation, we need to supplement the theory of les trois H – Hegel, Husserl and 
Heidegger – fantasists of ideal communities and pure desires, with the theory of the three 
masters of suspicion – Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.  
 
Here perhaps Nicolas Abraham, trained as a Husserlian phenomenologist but who turned 
to psychoanalysis, can help. Abraham maintains that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology is 
the right project, yet that it does not go far enough and can never become the science of 
sciences. This emerges in particular in Abraham’s account of the symbol.  
 
The psychoanalytic symbol is not to be understood as a substitute: it is not that I desire X 
and I symbolise it with the more acceptable Y; rather, we need a dynamic account of the 
emergence of symbols. For example, when one is scared of snakes it is not that “serpent” 
is a substitute for “phallus”. Instead, a patient’s dream of being held by a terrifying 
serpent satisfies both their tactile desire to touch the “phallus” and the horror the image 
evokes in them through the desire’s repression. The conflict of the desire and the 
repression of that desire produce at another level an experience that satisfies both the 
repressed desire and the repression. What is offered in the living present for 
phenomenological analysis is merely a dream about a frightening serpent; only a 
suspicious enquiry takes us beyond that to its dual sources. Psychoanalytic work allows 
the patient to correct their fear of serpents – to end up with a true and accurate horizon of 
their genuine risks of snakes, rather than a distorted noema caused by the projection of 
desires attached to another object. 
 
Why is this relevant to philosophy and geometry? Well, psychoanalysis is a complex 
theory of associations – the brute materials of passive synthesis. As with the irrational 
fear of snakes, a distorted horizon with regard to one object (I do not desire the phallus) 
points to a false horizon in another (snakes are terrifying), and so we take the second 
object incorrectly and either produce a distorted science of it or are incapable of 
producing any science at all. Only a suspicious analysis aiming at our true desire allows 
the clarification and correction of these associations and thus grants the undistorted 
noema for phenomenology. Furthermore, in a community only this will allow us to know 
we are dealing with the same objects – snakes are a different noema for our uncured 
patient and to someone else. All of this can easily apply to geometry. Even if I produce 
theories that are true of triangles, if the noema in the mental acts of different members of 
the community are different due to personal distortion the science is in crisis. 
 
One response would be to say that additional or missing associations remain an empirical 
issue – what matters is the possibility of a pure transcendental subjectivity having a 
mental act with the same content, regardless of whether empirical individuals actually 
bring distortions to the table. One could claim that the desire, the infinite task, Europe 
itself, all of these are only transcendental requirements that never need to be realised in 
any particular empirical individual. Yet, the Abrahamian psychoanalytic angle refuses to 
be relegated to the empirical. It is necessary that we have the fantasy of a community and 
its progress modelled on geometry, yet that fantasy is a symbol that appears on the basis 
of a prohibited desire for a very different model of the task and community. Perhaps we 
can only have the transcendentally necessary geometric fantasy that orients and guides 
genuine science on the basis of a fundamental patricidal urge and its repression. If 
phenomenology is the science of the subjective acts that ground the objectivist sciences, 
psychoanalysis can claim to be the science of the science of sciences – the account of the 
secret ideological formulations that produce and allow the fantasy of an infinite task that 
is the basis of objectivity; while paradoxically also being only another empirical science 
ruled over by phenomenology. 
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